I. INTRODUCTION
In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates says that justice is not limited to the courts of law, and thus the penalty of injustice cannot be "stripes and death," especially since this penalty does not always fall on the wrongdoer. 4 Rather justice is located in public life, and the penalty we pay may very well be connected to the patterns we make because these patterns are what we come to resemble. In effect, humans possess the directed power to fi gure a pattern for a just society by using the resources of an art (techne) of rhetoric. considered justice's counterpart. Traditionally speaking, rhetoric, as defi ned by Aristotle, is the antistrophe (antistrophos, literally,"turning about") to dialectic. A few commentators who stress the word antistrophe illuminate the relation between rhetoric and dialectic as dance, specifi cally a choral or fi gure dance of ancient Greek drama. 6 The dance that commentators say is dwelling in the word antistrophe is barely visible. The warring relation between rhetoric and dialectic over justice that has lasted for more than two thousand years overshadows any dance, but not the body. 7 As far back as the early days of the Athenian assembly, a use of rhetoric has been intimately connected with a use of the body. Aristotle sets aside judicial rhetoric as a mode of defending oneself and conquering the other. And he cast deliberative rhetoric as the forum for matters of war and peace. Thus images of rhetoric, body, and war are bound up by a mingling of vocabulary and by rhetorical skills being deployed to conquer and defend. If rhetoric and dialectic bear the trace of dance and if the use of rhetoric and the use of the body are intimately tied, could the body of the dancer resurface? If so, could the dancer's feet become the internal movement between participants engaged in disputation common to judicial and deliberative rhetoric? Moreover, could the agnostic (and all too often antagonistic) relation common to disputation be choreographed to make a pattern that we could resemble for a just society? It is the sense of dance embedded in antistrophe that acts as our bridge for moving back and forth between rhetoric as rhetoric is the antistrophe of dialectic and dialectic is the antistrophe of justice.
Undoubtedly, our line of questioning contains an element of interpretative play. And why not? Johan Huizinga, in his classic work Homo Ludens, says play initiated the verbal battle or agonistic form that defi nes the law and justice as we know it today.
8 He writes, " [t] he connection between playing and dancing are so close that they hardly need illustrating. It is not that dancing has something of play in it or about it, rather that it is an integral part of play. Dancing is a particular and particularly perfect form of play." 9 In effect, dance is part and parcel of the judicial form. What happened to it? The playful, according to Huizinga, was "lifted on to the plane of that sacred seriousness which every society demands for its justice….
10 So play interpenetrates with disputation and with justice. It was the engine that generated a form recognized today as serious and sacred.
11 Indeed, the serious and sacred form links with justice in a manner that is "solid, binding, and canonical."
12 Could we "turn about" (antistrophe) and play? Could we spark an old but new form, like dance? We think so.
This essay attempts not to deduce, to induce or to draw conclusions about justice. Rather, it means to engage rhetoric as a way "to antistrophe" generatively across the fi eld of justice, refl ecting radically upon an existing pattern of war in argument, and offering dance as a pattern for an approach to justice. It would be fair to say that our essay is what Hannah Arendt would call "an exercise in thinking."
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In particular, this exercise in thinking attempts to sketch what public life bears witness to in ordinary circumstances of disputation and to show how the process could be fi gured as a dance. Ordinarily, argument is based in moves which elicit countermoves, and the agonistic model is the context for them. The argument is settled with a win, a win that bears the trace of a body vanquished, like a boxer or wrestler on the mat. What we witness through the agonistic way in public life often imposes pain, suffering, and violence.
14 So we attempt, in the spirit of the epigram by Michelstaedter, to exceed the pattern of disputation by making a new one out of a sequence of movements, embracing a "response-ability," an ability to respond to the other with the body. Specifi cally, it is the body of the dancer that articulates a future pattern of disputation. And so the pattern to which we aim is dance. Yes, dance for, above all, its moves engender partnering. In an effort to clarify this process, we turn to the resources of rhetoric, in particular its tropes of antistrophe, chiasmus, and metaphor, and then sketch the general features of a pattern of argument that resembles dance. Our notion of dance, in conjunction with how we articulate a pattern of argument as dance, means to sharpen a reader's perception so as to see an extraordinary space we refer to as a middle space. Until we have a space that we can really conceive of, we cannot leap out of the fi ghting line (of arguing and of thought about arguing) and dance. The middle space, if it were embodied with dancers, could provide public life with what Jacques Derrida refers to as a sense of "justice worthy of its name."
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II. THE MIDDLE SPACE
The middle space is form and process. After detailing these aspects, we are in a position to render the middle space theoretically as an opening. This opening has a close affi nity with what Kelly Oliver, following Julia Kristeva, calls an "imaginary third." 16 Described as the split between reality and the ideal, or between being and meaning, the imaginary third, or middle, constitutes a space of support for the body of each participant to move like a dancer.
As form, the middle space resembles chiasmus (literally "crossing"). Envisaging the middle space as the Greek letter X, chiasmus means to show one part of an opposition crossing over the other. In the case of choral dance, bodies mark this space as such. The dancers relate directly to the other by their movement-a schema of dance we describe later-and this movement effectively opens the "in-between," the gap-where the crossover or dance takes place. The middle space structures the framework wherein arguers acquire their relationship through a process of disputation patterned as dance. But yet, the context of the framework is process, and therefore the form is not static. Form is like a direction, the directional movement of bodies.
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As process, the middle space vis-à-vis justice can be captured, but only for a moment. It is the movement of time, as Simone Weil says, to which the art of justice must attend.
18 For example, "in music-if a pause between two notes is prolonged too much, if the conductor starts a crescendo a moment to soon, then no musical emotion is aroused."
19 She also considers and illustrates the problem of time in other arts, such as the art of drama and the art of medicine. Then, Weil asks, should the art of justice be exempt from the "law of timing"? 20 The answer, of course, is no. Thus, it is the ability to see without letting a moment pass. Such experiential "timing," as Arendt explains it, is what constitutes meaning for a world that is "unlike the world or culture in which we are born." 21 In time stands not only the possibility of the middle space, but also an opening to see where justice could be enacted if it were to use the law of timing.
The process of observing the middle space is a function of its form. The ability to see the middle space, therefore, requires one's eyes to crossover or dance. The crossover refers not to a physical condition of the eyes, but to a fi gural way of seeing that is double. In this way, it is possible to see violence-the extreme end of agonistic disputes-as dance-becoming. hypothetical-deductive models of logic, but also seeing argument formally as an invisible dance lurking in the deep phenomenal background. We cannot emphasize enough that the process of noticing the middle is not a literal process. It requires an act of imagination, a blink, if you will, which is what enables one to glimpse the opening. The middle space is an effect of the structure of chiasmus.
The structure of chiasmus (X) is indicative of intertwined bodies and, the structure as such, declares dance. Chiasmus is, therefore, not a stylistic device, but rather is a playful instrument that activates the pre-objective aspect of consciousness which, in turn, induces tension between what is and what can be. 24 Play, according to Huizinga, is older than culture, and "it is a signifi cant function." 25 Its function is to convey that "there is something 'at play '." 26 What is at play is the initial or early stage of a dance and a communicative relationship from which dance might suffi ciently emerge as a new pattern. The pre-objective consciousness is what notices or sees the imperfectly formed idea of dance and, following Malcolm Gladwell, the seeing may be called a "blink."
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A blink is a complex phenomenon: it is the power of the glance in less than two seconds or more. Yoking it to double vision, it would be fair to say that blinking entails seeing the invisible from a pre-objective consciousness. Why blink? Formally, the space of the middle exists as a point on the diagonal where the pressure of constant fi ghting with another collapses into the hole of two lines passing through the other and converging at a point. There, in the dark hole of convergence as we explain later, one has to "blink" on the behalf of the enemy in order to expose and render visible an opening with enough room for the "reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other" as the lines cross. 28 The action of blinking arises in play, and the mode struck by dance portrays something by way of another trope, metaphor, which we shall discuss in a moment.
Why dance? Dance is the "archaic speech." 29 Therefore, it is most likely to emerge in a blink or from the pre-objective aspect of consciousness because 24 Pre-objective awareness may be compared to Charles S. Pierce's Firstness and to Gregory
Batson's feelings that exists in consciousness as abstract principles. For a productive discussion of the relation between Pierce and Bateson, see Deborah Eicher-Catt, "The Logic of the Sacred in Bateson and Pierce" (2003) 19 American Journal of Semiotics 95. It could be argued that preobjective awareness is a "primary speech" or rhetoric that comes before rational consideration. Viewed as such, pre-objective awareness would "sketch the framework" for a rational consideration of something. See Grassi, Rhetoric, supra note 5 at 20. Stitching together Bateson's' sense of feelings existing as abstract principles and Grassi's notion of primary speech, we regard pre-objective awareness as a form of play (below) which, for the most part, has receded in the background and is absorbed into logic. 29 According to Grassi, Rhetoric, supra note 5 at 20, archaic (which refers to "dominant, arche, archomai, archontes or the dominants)" has a rhetorical, therefore imaginative or fi gurative character, and becomes the basis of rational thought as archaic speech receded into the background. The role of archiac speech vis-à-vis rational thought bears a strong resemblance to the role of play in law and legal argument as articulated by Huizinga, Homo Ludens, supra note 8 at 76-88.
dance is "the perfect form of play." 30 The middle space, therefore, claims its form as generative of "playfulness" at the level of arguing and at the level of blinking argument as a pattern that we want to resemble. By imagining what we can resemble, we connect to public life and are connected to it by the patterns we see. In the middle space, the reader is afforded an opportunity to relax the watch of reason or the eye of intellect and blink on behalf of the enemy.
By putting form and process together, the middle space is clearly not a physical one. Unlike the physical space of the court, the middle is a theoretical space, in the "original sense of 'theoretical' [theorein-that is, to see]."
31 MerleauPonty says the middle space demands a kind of theorizing that eschews thinking "by planes and perspectives."
32 As such, he treats middle space as a space that cannot be measured, unlike a traditional canon which typically acts as an external guidepost for measuring theoretical space associated with the letters and arts. Drawing from Merleau-Ponty and extending the middle space to the law, Conklin observes it is without objects and "cannot be measured nor can it be divided into determinate, discrete components," typically of representations of the other in the structure or thought of the law. 33 When representations of the other rely on measures, like a canon of law, the other is not only objectifi ed and thus disembodied, but also and perhaps more damaging, the body is concealed in or trapped by representation. Legal discourse is a monologue, and as such, meaning is produced by speaking to and/or on behalf of someone who is positioned in the physical space of the court while the body, contained by verbal and written discourse, recedes to the background.
The middle space provides the ground where it is possible to imagine or fi gure direct participation with the other. This form of direct participation is enacted verbally and nonverbally through the body and its ability to respondgesture, move, and act in the environing world. Conklin, therefore, refers to the middle space as "the intertext of a dialogic relation." 34 The middle space is characterized by intertwining relations, like the fi gure X and thus means to show that addresser and addressee produce embodied meaning in the interpretive act. Acknowledging the gap between relations spun out of legal discourse and the phenomenological experience of those relations as a text that connects, Conklin retrieves the middle space as a form and process for revealing absent elements banished or dismissed by monologic forms of address and the judgment to which they inhere.
Before moving on and explaining the dancing steps, we turn to other resources of rhetoric in order to clarify the middle space-the ground-through the process of transference and intensifi cation as articulated by Friedrich Nietzsche, especially his lectures on rhetoric at the University of Basel in 1872-1873. 35 The processes of transference and intensifi cation do not say what the middle space is; they indicate how a middle space could be made. In other words, the dance metaphor must be articulated as a viable process before any dancing can be seen or enacted.
III. TRANSFERENCE
Nothing at fi rst sight is less danceable than argument. In its most elementary form, argument stands for verbal opposition and contention leading sometimes to violent altercation with the other. Nothing, therefore, seems more impossible than imagining argument as a dance. However, there is a way. Metaphor seems to hold the key to fi guring argument as dance.
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Metaphor involves transferring the activity of dancing to arguing. The word metaphor suggests as much: the word metaphor is a metaphor. It is "derived from the verb metapherin 'to transfer,' which originally described a concrete activity" and is now understood theoretically. 37 In effect, transference commits us to "reaching back" to sensory meaning in phenomenon and then putting meaning into play as we described it at the beginning of this essay.
A. Metaphor
Metaphors defi ne a relationship between two terms. Take the terms "argument" and "war," for example. These two terms are not to be taken by themselves. Rather, they are related by an activity of implication. The metaphor-argument is war-states an equivalence but not in the form of an equal (=) sign. The equivalence is active and energetic, like shuttling or traffi cking "betwixt and between," much like the "turning about" performed by the ancient Greek chorus described earlier. The act of traffi cking between the terms, which were taken from separate semantic domains, does the work of making meaning because the traffi cking "betwixt and between" bridges the domains, thereby fusing and altering them. The traffi cking between terms alters the terms, and the process is complete when the terms fuse and become a new meaning so instantiated in language and thought that the new meaning, in effect, goes unrecognized as metaphor.
For our purposes, what the above discussion highlights is the transference or the defi ning of a relationship between terms. If a meaning is to become real and existent, the relationship between the two terms comprising the metaphor must have valence and thus become bound together by a sort of intellectual sympathy. The two ruling terms, in this case argument and war, display their relationship of equivalence through everyday talk. The latter reveals our choices and our intellectual sympathies about argument. For example, English 36 Robert L. Ivie "The Metaphor of Force in Prowar Discourse: The Case of 1812," (1982) 68 Quarterly Journal of Speech at 253 writes: "The act of literalizing the metaphor … is the defi ning of reality itself." The story of the metaphor and its relation has enjoyed a long discussion from the sophists through Aristotle to Nietzsche. speakers (at least in the United States) say, "I demolished his argument." "She shot down all the major points." "If they use that strategy, we'll wipe them out." "He attacked all the evidence." There is in these expressions a strong sense of staking out a claim, much as one would defend or conquer property with weapons.
Collectively, the examples of metaphoric expression taken from everyday life (above) reveal no new patterns; rather, they compose thematic variations on the two terms, argument and war. The repetition of the compositional theme serves to show the commitment for sustaining and nurturing a relationship between argument and war. In effect, our intellectual sympathy for the relationship constitutes the way we organize experience and the way we embody the structure of argument. In effect, the pattern fi gures communicative interaction in the modality of war and, in this manner, public life comes to resemble a pattern of exchange that, when carried to its logical conclusion, casts the other as an enemy.
Although we choose our metaphors, we fail to observe, however, that our notion of argument is a metaphoric construction and thus a choice. As such, the metaphor-argument is war-is a dormant one or can be called a dead metaphor. By a dead metaphor we mean that we conduct the important business of arguing for something as though we were deeply asleep.
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What words we decide to bind together builds up a reality that, according to Nietzsche, appears "solid, canonical, and binding." 39 The way in which a speaker talks "about" or frames what an argument is, in effect, "in-forms" or "per-forms" how a speaker acts towards some body in a situation of argument. Drawing from George Lakoff 's scholarship on metaphor, 40 it is arguable that war is a primary schema of perception by which we experience disagreement with another. As such, we take the metaphor "argument is war" into our perception of what an adversarial structure is and then into our everyday and institutional practices of disagreeing. Thus, we shoot down what somebody said. Insofar as the metaphor is solid, binding, and canonical, we limit our ability to respond-what Kelly Oliver calls "response-ability"-to others with whom we disagree. 41 The words demolish, shot down, and attack comprise the experience of war and bear witness, therefore, not just to the meaning of argument but to our ability to respond to the other.
While metaphors can be lively and generative of new meaning, the ones we use repetitively to "turn about" a warring pattern of disputation are worn and old. Doubtless this is why George Orwell made it a rule never to use a metaphor that is seen in print. 42 What if we were to say metaphor is dance! It would offer a new metaphor; however, our intellectual sympathy for the pattern of war has made the idea of embodying dance diffi cult. We are infl exible, perhaps due to the seriousness of argument. These metaphors of war -metaphors that we live by -appear reluctant, therefore, to play, and play is needed. It enables a new pattern to emerge as a way of settling differences. To return to the language of Nietzsche, humans create relationships out of metaphors, and then treat the relationships as solid, canonical, because humans need something to "hitch" their actions to as they ride their "wagon of life." 43 In this way, humans no longer are obligated to do or to make or to create or to imagine but can sit back and enjoy the ride that has been imagined for them. As such, humans can be passively transferred along by the metaphors they created, unless they not only make new ones but also they must transfer the potential meaning. As we will soon see, this transference requires the body.
So the literature of rhetoric and of metaphor is full of the knowledge that metaphor shapes reality and that reality is shaped by metaphor. The literature also tells us that it is possible to change our metaphors. But while theorists have enabled us to see the mass of metaphors working behind the scenes, thereby pushing us to realize that we as human subjectivities can change our metaphors, it remains unclear how we might enact the transformation that is necessary to change the metaphor. What if we were to agree to transfer dance to argument? Now what? The next step is intensifi cation.
IV. INTENSIFICATION
Intensifi cation is the strength of focus that transference requires if the metaphor is to have the depth and power to enact change. Theoretically, this focus is obtained through myth, proverb, or fable.
44 Throughout the work of Kenneth Burke, the notion of myth affi xed to proverb and fable is "a strategy for dealing with a situation." 45 In this case, myth asserts something upon the unformed schema of dance which can lead to a body performing it. With intensifi cation, we ask the following kinds of questions: How could the play of argument be reenergized theoretically as dance rather than as war? Or, how can we reach back and transfer the schema of dance to argument, to the extent that it could obtain a magnitude that is solid, canonical and binding? That is, how can the schema of dance be embodied as argument to the extent that perception would yield a middle space wherein a mode of dance might support disputation in public life? To answer these questions we go to myth, particularly the myth regarding the origins or beginnings of rhetoric.
A. Myth and the Origins of Rhetoric
One myth on the origin of rhetoric asserts a kind movement of hands, feet, and eyes, a schema of dance. The schema effects a way around tyrants 43 Nietzsche, "Truth", supra note 12 at 250. 44 At fi rst glance it seems odd to return to myth, especially in the wake of poststructuralist's analysis of myth as yet another problematic form of concealment. Ernst Cassirer, "Mythic, Aesthetic, and Theoretical Space" (1969) 2:1 Man and World 3 at 9 supports this strategy while mindful of the fact that myth in the twentieth century can be a technique manufactured by the political state according to the same methods "as machine guns or airplanes" [Cassirer, "Mythic"] . For a full discussion of the limits and possibilities of myth, see also 46 It is the dance performance that creates a space of communicative exchange among the people depicted in the myth of rhetoric as the demos. Then the process of transference, which the myth of rhetoric enables, takes over and breathes a "freshness and immediacy of life"-that is a body-into argument. 47 There are many myths or strategies for dealing with a situation, and what we sketched above and will return to later is one of at least eight myths on the origins of rhetoric. The myth we sketched is not the myth prevalent in traditional discussions about the judicial and deliberative genres. 48 What is important here is not the number of myths but that a myth is selected as the beginning. Our point is simple: we can make a new choice and thus begin a new. Traditionally speaking, the primary myth on which rhetoric derives its schema of argument on how to engage the other involves the law courts. The people [or lawyers in the common law adversarial system] devise a structure of argument requiring the defeat of one side and thus they secure individual rights of property ownership. By the traditionally mythic account, argument as war is a strategic performance emanating from a situation, the need to settle differences in a civilized way by using words, not weapons. Thus [argument as war uses words] to speak and act in a civil manner when staking out property to conquer or defend the property. The myth dealing with rhetoric and the law courts is an effect of a metaphoric transfer from common physical forms of conduct, such as fi ghting, to a verbal model of sparring. As Huizinga puts it, "the pronouncing of judgment (and hence legal justice itself) and trial by ordeal both have their roots in agonistic decision, where the outcome of the contest-whether by lots, chance, or a trial of some kind (strength, endurance, etc.)-speaks the fi nal word?" 49 Arguing with somebody is, to varying degrees, an extension of an agonistic model.
50
The rhetorical communication through the movement of various parts of the body or body speech can legitimately be intensifi ed as dance. The myth that reveals the origin of rhetoric in "body speech," which is dance, is found in the Myth of Gelon and Hieron. 51 outline how the myth is a strategic predication upon a people which leads to a performance of dance. The place is Syracuse and the time is 467-66 B.C.E. The story goes that two "savage" tyrants, Gelon and Hieron, ruled over the people. One day, the tyrants, who were afraid that the people would speak out against them, "strengthened the force of their tyranny" against the people by cutting them off from speech. 52 Forbidden to speak and yet wanting to argue against the tyrants, the people signifi ed "what was appropriate by means of their feet, hands, and eyes whenever one of them was in need."
53 And "it was in this way, they say, that dance-pantomime had its beginnings."
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The people contrived "to explain their business with gestures [or dancefi gures: schemansi]." 55 The people argued against the tyrannical position not by attacking it but by moving their feet, their hands, their eyes; in short, they danced around the tyrants' position, and it worked because the people moved interdependently and thus were able to accommodate their meaning. By learning to speak by dancing, the people formed an ensemble and in this manner practiced an art of rhetoric. Rhetoric came to the people when they were forbidden "to utter any sound at all."
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As the mythic characters breathe, move rhythmically and live the life within the new structure and engage the process of dance, the myth transfers our familiar experience of oppositional discourse around the agonistic model based in a traditional myth, and in this way, argument emerges with a different nuance: body speech embodies the theoretical space of argument, and with the body comes a psychic-feeling-sensing space peculiar to dance. Dance is, as Floyd Merrel has illustrated in Change through Signs of Body, Mind, and Language, a supreme relational model of interdependence and interactivity. 57 In this vein, Cassirer reminds us also that dance provides access to another human world beyond the "universe of [verbal] speech" and this other universe of speech which comprises at once myth and dance has a structure of its own.
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Working with Merrel's ideas and combining them with Cassirer, we would add that because dancers function both independently and communally, dance is the process of reconciling independence with community. A dancer not only moves his or her own body independently, but also has to harmonize those movements with music or with other dancers to produce a dance. Dance is therefore a form of communication (emphasis on key root mun-not uni-) 59 that enables one to argue by using movement, specifi cally the movement of the hands, eyes, feet and other various parts of the body.
What we see, therefore, in this myth of dance and rhetoric are two key 60 Body speech or dance uses the feet to circumvent or to go around the opponent while the boxer's feet deploys a structure where the task is to bring down the opponent. The feet of the boxer-that some say are dancing-function only by virtue of the sense-context of sparring in a physical space; and thus feet are a secondary factor on which demolishing the opponent depends. 61 In dance, the feet are primary. Like the people's [dancers] feet that went around the tyrants, the feet are the transferring power, the embodied metaphor of the dancer, intensifi ed in myth. This takes us to the middle space.
The second key point is that the process of articulating the people's [dancer's] and the tyrants' limbs in concert draws them into an intimate relation. As such, they have to coordinate with each other to get around the deadlock. The nature of the process engenders the coordination. When the dancer moves her or his hand, the eye has to follow. The decision to move is not derived from the action of moves and countermoves. But rather, the movement inheres within the process of coordination. Argument receives its particular content and arrangement only from the order of bodies as they form a chiasmus. The value of changing metaphors, then, is incalculable. The metaphor envisaging argument as dance contains within it the ability to transform what has been heretofore conceived as adversarial into a model of interactivity and interdependence. (London and New York: Verso, 1993) . Our model has organic ties with Mouffe's "agonistic pluralism;" however she does not problematize how "the great tradition of rhetoric" (at 130) acts to deny authority (kuron) to women and slaves. For discussion, see Jane S. Sutton, "Intersections: Woman, Rhetoric, and Domination," (2006) 22 American Journal of Semiotics 129. Authority (kurios), traditionally, is the prerequisite to political deliberation according to Aristotle, supra note 6 at 1367b. In political rhetoric, Aristotle places matters of war and peace under its purview. Women and slaves who are denied the rhetorical skills, therefore, are not able to engage in matters of war. Moreover, It is not enough to intensify our perception of argument as dance. Insofar as the myth contains within it the activity of movement, it must also be able to impress upon psychic space the performance of the mythic form if dance is to be transferred from the structure of argument and intensifi ed as dance to the degree that it becomes what Nietzsche refers to as a schema of perception. 63 Mythic space must undergo a process of building and become a space for performance characterized as solid, canonical, and binding. In short, we must be able to re-present body-speech on the stage and as a standard of the middle space. Before we turn to the architectural sign of the middle space, we make dancing lessons from the concepts of transference and intensifi cation. We wish to bring dance before the eyes of the reader.
V. DANCING LESSONS AND JAMES MEREDITH
In what follows we apply a use of the body and a myth of rhetoric to one of the most memorable images from the Civil Rights Movement in the United States: namely, the sequence of photographs that capture the shooting of James Meredith during his "Walk Against Fear March" in Mississippi. On the second day of the march, a sniper shot Meredith, and a photographer, Jack Thornell, recorded the incident in a series of dramatic photographs. The fi rst photograph shows Meredith as he falls after the shot, the second as he attempts to raise himself off the ground, and the fi nal picture shows him prone on the ground, with two men bending over him as they come to his assistance. These astonishing pictures became powerful images of the racial disunity and murderous hatred that confronted the Civil Rights movement as it sought to end racial segregation in the U.S.A. However, approached and interpreted through the metaphor of dance, these photographs reveal another reality, a reality diametrically opposed to the conventionally accepted one. By seeing body-speech in these images in an effort to get around the tyranny of hate and violence, we may give form to argument as reconciliation and unity, rather than seeing the body on the ground as the standard by which confrontation and disunity depends. Following King's epigram, we present James Meredith on the ground, therefore, not as a vanquished opponent but as a pioneer leading us to a new world [that is] becoming.
In the fi rst picture (fi gure 1), Meredith is depicted in graceful downward motion, his torso dramatically balanced on his hands and knees, legs held aloft in a perfect V. The overall effect is a perfect balance of motion and restthe body at an equilibrium of kinesis and stasis. The hands and knees anchor the body fi rmly on the ground, while the suspended torso, the raised legs, and the pointed feet suggest motion, fl ight. This position captures the essence of dance, the body in motion and the body at rest in the same instant. The power of this stance lies in the timing and potential that exists in the dynamic between stasis and kinesis. The dancer's body is cued, vibrant with the power of its potential, charging the atmosphere around it.
an agonistic pluralism, we argue following the views set forth in this essay, would have to be connected to the great tradition of the use of the body in dance and architecture rather than to a use of the body articulated to rhetoric theoretically bound to an agonistic model. 63 Nietzsche, "Truth", supra note 12 at 250. In the second picture (fi gure 2), Meredith's torso is stretched out horizontally, barely raised, resting on the sharp pivot of a single elbow, legs fully stretched out. The dancer moving from the fi rst position of contained potential has released kinetic power in the motion of lowering the torso, shifting balance to the elbow, and lowering the legs from their V to the ground. The body is now fi rmly in the realm of stasis, and the kinetic transfer needed to achieve this position releases energy into the surrounding environment. In the third and fi nal picture (fi gure 3), two fi gures bend over a now fully prone Meredith, reaching down to touch him, heads bent, torsos seemingly balanced on hands that rest on Meredith, the bent legs forming a V at the knees. The two fi gures now have the perfect balance of motion and rest-their bodies at an equilibrium of stasis and kinesis. The hands fi rmly anchor the bodies on Meredith's prone form, while the suspended torsos and bent knees suggest motion, fl ight. Once more we are back in a position that captures the essence of dance, the body in motion and at rest in the same instant and the potential that exists in the dynamic between stasis and kinesis. Meredith, the solo dancer of the fi rst two movements has released the energy of his body, as he moves from one position to the next, and the two dancers receive this energy from him, and in turn their bodies become charged, vibrant with the power of the potential received from him.
We acknowledge that our apprehension of the photo sequence that depicts the shooting of James Meredith is imaginative and demands of the reader a radical re-imagining or a momentary change of perspective that could, as we described earlier, be called a "blink."
64 In this context, the blink can be viewed as a glance that transmits a sudden new perspective, enabling a new way of perceiving or a new way of seeing things. The blink is intense and functions aphoristically to intuit something potent in the chaos and confusion, and this intuitive glance happens in less than two seconds or more. 65 Figure 4 (below) is our attempt to depict the blink in slow motion. The blink involves what Gladwell calls "thinslicing". "Thinslicing" sees deeply not into content but into the nonverbal rhythm or some formal components of the narrowest slivers of experience. 66 The slivers of experience compare with the Xhosa aphorism "blinking on behalf of the enemy."
Read or understood this way, these pictures show Meredith not as a victim, but as a lead dancer orchestrating the movements of the other dancers. In effect, Meredith bends the white dancers to his will. In this way, he characterizes what King called a pioneer "with his noble sense of purpose" because Meredith becomes a pioneer of a theoretical boundary of communication, with the emphasis on exchange.
67 Ultimately, the act of reimagining this sequence of photographs through the metaphor of dance not only yields a new perception, but demands what George Orwell calls "a change of attitude." The James Meredith Shooting Re-Imagined as Dance Drawing by Nkanyiso Mpofu .
The experience of argument as dance, as opposed to the imagination of it expressed in the preceding section (fi gure 4), takes us to Nelson Mandela whom we depict as performing a dance in middle space.
VI. NELSON MANDELA, THE DANCER, AND THE MIDDLE SPACE
While Nelson Mandela, the South African political leader, was in prison for his opposition to Apartheid, he and his fellow prisoners had to devise strategies to maintain their dignity and integrity in the face of demeaning and abusive treatment by the guards. 69 When the guards demanded that the prisoners move at a rapid pace, literally at a run, Mandela insisted that his fellow prisoners not defy the guards but rather walk at a deliberate pace. More tellingly, he placed himself at the head of the column, (a sign of chiasmus?), thus compelling the other prisoners behind him to slow down. The guards who were at the rear of the column had, in turn, to slow down to the prisoners' pace if they were not to stumble and fall over the prisoners in front of them. Wordlessly, through the use of his body, specifi cally of his feet, Mandela brought the guards and prisoners into common accord. The act of slowing the guards down was accomplished not through direct confrontation, but through a process of seemingly obeying the guards' orders to 67 Bass, Blessed supra note 3 at 255. 68 Orwell, "Politics" supra note 2 at 351. 69 For a view of this, see John Carlin, "The Long Walk of Nelson Mandela" PBS (25 May 1999). move, thus giving the guards space to adjust, while ultimately compelling them to a pace that was respectful of the prisoners. Like a dancer, Mandela used his body to create or induce harmony with others, avoiding the disharmony or violence of collisions. In much the same way, the seemingly inevitable explosion resulting from the racial antagonism of Apartheid was avoided through a process that is comprehensible through the metaphor of dance.
While in prison, Mandela decided that the best way to move beyond the impasse of Apartheid was to give the Government space to move around him. He did that by his willingness to step back and away from his position thereby giving the Apartheid Government room to move. Metaphorically, Mandela gave way and moved his body to accommodate his opponent. In effect, he invoked the Xhosa aphorism of "blinking on behalf of the enemy" both in word and deed. 70 This aphorism, which the Xhosa employ as a means for moving beyond the deadlock of antagonism into reconciliation, comes from the image of two opponents engaged in a staring-down contest which can only end with one party blinking. In this usage, the blinking is regarded not as an admission of defeat, but rather as the more magnanimous gesture of selfl essly moving aside to allow room for the opponent to move around for the greater good of breaking the deadlock. The glance of an opening, coupled with a sequence of steps that characterizes blinking on behalf of an enemy, is a performance of activity, potency, and goodness -in effect, a dance.
Given the sense of the middle as a space of movement, we insist, therefore, that it is the body of Nelson Mandela, rather than the obstruction of Nelson Mandela as person, that stands for the dancer. Since it is not Mandela, the speaking person, who pushes through the opposing argument but rather a dancing body, the middle space should not be confused with the middle voice. 71 The space is embodied and thus cannot exist without the body composing and inventing. The body by its very nature is responsive, and will therefore, move or compose a movement to avoid collision.
It is the exercise and practice of dance as argument that is exerted and that passes rhythmically around and through the prison guards and the prisoners who oppose Apartheid. Confronted with an obstacle, the body, prisoner or guard, will seek a way to move around it. A good example of bodies moving around the other are the prisoners and guards walking in prison as depicted 70 When Tokyo Sexwale says (in Ibid.) that Mandela "blinked on behalf of the enemy," he is invoking this Xhosa metaphor. 71 In grammatical terms, the middle voice is refl exive. As a verbal form, it provides a way to characterize a subject affecting the actions of him/herself. This refl exivity, according to Hayden White, "Writing in the Middle Voice," (1992) 9.2 Stanford Literature Review 179 at 186-187 parodies dialogue insofar as there is not an actual encounter with the other. In effect, it is a voice vacant of bodies. Thus White argues that the middle voice risks becoming "obsessionally neurotic" (at 187) because without contact with the embodied other, the encounter can only affect the self. Obessionally neurotic behavior may very well constitute a narcissistic form of communication. According to Isaac E. Catt, "Communicology and Narcissism: Disciplines of the Heart," (2002) 4 Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies 389 at 395, it is a means of "withdrawal from active participation while simultaneously giving the appearance of being actively, meaningfully, and caringly engaged with others." The middle voice gives the appearance of dialogue, but is devoid of dancers who need the direct participation of the other if there is to be a dance. In this manner, the middle voice is not the same as middle space, nor can it be(come) the voice of the middle space.
in the documentary (1999) The Long Walk of Nelson Mandela. The exertion of the body, the gesture of feet and hands, opens the space of the middle and thus enacts a new form of response to the other. The middle space, in effect, innovates "response-ability" or the ability to respond.
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Viewed this way, Mandela's actions are very similar to Meredith's metaphorical dance. Meredith, as a pioneer, strategically predicated reconciliation upon his opponents with a body lurking in the background of law and judicial rhetoric; Mandela did so with his physical body. While Meredith's reconciliation is an imaginary movement that frames transference and its power to release possibility, Mandela's reconciliation is intensely mythic in that it leads to an actual performance. Either way, both modes of reconciliation enact a blinking on behalf of the enemy to achieve accommodation. Both Meredith's and Mandela's performances may be called 'dancing with the enemy'.
Thus far, we have shown argument as dance. We fi rst saw the dance in the mythic space of rhetoric. Then, we saw dance concretely but in an exceedingly vague way in the disposition of James Meredith outstretched, down on the ground with two white men bending over him. Our drawing (fi gure 4) of the photo sequence imagines them rhetorically within the mythic space of dance. Our drawing, therefore, is not a copy of the fi gures as dancers. Rather our drawing attempts to cut a new pattern and show a human enactment in a new method of disputation with another human. Next, we encountered Nelson Mandela acting as though he were in a space of disputation fi gured as dance. Mandela induces reconciliation by blinking and thereby making a dancing imprint on the ground of argument with his feet that predicates performance in middle space.
At this point, we have danced and thus transferred the activity from thinking in a war domain to a dance domain where we employed myth to intensify body speech. Now we need an architectural blueprint of this activity, if we are to build a middle space. Following Cassirer, we turn to the realm of sculpture and architecture. They, sculpture and architecture, make it possible to move the dance scheme into a new sphere so that it can become solid, binding, and canonical. In effect, the middle space relies on representation (Darstellung).
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In this case, representation "is by no means a merely passive copying of the world;" rather "it is a new relationship" in which humans place themselves to the world."
74 How can we place ourselves as dancers in the world? How could we measure our movements to determine if they would lead to a performance of dance? One way that mythic space (which is body-speech and which is dance) could be particularized in middle space as a canonical form is through something called the Kanon which has a referent in ancient architecture and sculpture. In this essay, we briefl y focus on one architectural example.
72 Oliver, Suppression, supra note 15 at 199. 73 Cassirer, "Mythic" supra note 44 at 12. 74 Ibid.
the imprint of the foot displayed on the "Kanon" represents, not a length, but the activity and potency of movement based on response. Using the foot as a sign of response-ability, the function of the "Kanon" may be compared with the use of feet to get around the tyrant and to enact a form of reconciliation. The foot, therefore, signifi es a living, logical way to display physically how we understand or thin slice outstretched hands as the theoretical embodiment of reconciliation in the middle space. In this manner, the feet and hands represent in architecture what is becoming solid, canonical, and binding of human relationship if built up as such. Now with an architectural sign, we may very well say we have a "canon" or an archetype for forging a relationship between humans. The relationship uses the standard of the body as a measure when there is no visible standard of the body in the structure of argument. In this sense, it can be said that the "Kanon" serves "to state a canon" 80 for which there is not yet a schema that fi nds for justice the fl ow of endless and boundless dialogue.
The body in stone offers a glimpse of a possible form of dance 'becomingargument'. Set in stone, the body is the measure for direct participation with the other. Set in stone is not an image, therefore, but the reality of the structure of argument. We wish by the end of this essay, for the reader to have moved from viewer of argument as war to emulating a body such as Nelson Mandela, who argues by dancing. Finally, with the stone carving on the side of a building, we wish to entice the reader into the middle space where he or she might begin not only to see argument as dance but also to obtain some sense of how to become the agent of dance.
CONCLUSION
Chiasmus, the fi gure envisaged as diagonal, actualizes a unique space called the middle space which is a dimension of becoming. Produced by the logical turns of contraries, contradictions and subalternations, chiasmus is not just a representation of diagonal markings; rather it shapes or forms something and that something can become real. Articulating argument as dance in a diagonal arrangement offers, therefore, an exercise in thinking of how to construe argument as dance and perhaps a diagram on how we could follow an exercise program and become dancers with the enemy.
